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Abstract:   
We address the issue of risk aversion in a competitive equilibrium when some buyers 
engage in learning and information is conveyed through the price system. Specifically, 
since the learning process yields uncertainty, we study the effect of risk aversion on the 
equilibrium outcomes of the model, including the amount of information released by the 
market. We show that risk aversion has an effect on the market outcomes but not on the 
flow of information. In particular, an increase in risk aversion lowers the competitive price 
and quantity. However, an increase in risk aversion does not change the amount of 
information embedded in the equilibrium price. 
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1 Introduction
One of the central questions in the field of economics of uncertainty is the
effect of risk aversion on behavior. The question has been long studied.
In general, agents interact in markets and thus risk aversion influences not
only behavior directly, but also indirectly through the equilibrium or the
market outcomes such as prices and quantities. This is especially relevant in
markets with asymmetric information in which the agents face uncertainty
due to incomplete information, but learn from observing prices.
It is well known that market prices are instrumental in disseminating
information to market participants (Grossman, 1989). The informational
role of prices is generally studied in a noisy environment in which there is
asymmetric information about a characteristic of the good being traded. In
much of the literature on the dissemination of information via prices, agents
are assumed to be risk-neutral. In fact, little is known about the role risk
aversion plays in the conveyance of information. It is our purpose to study
the effect of risk aversion on the competitive equilibrium when agents in the
markets are uninformed, but extract information from the price.
Specifically, in a noisy environment in which the price conveys information
imperfectly, the learning process is itself a source of uncertainty, which must
be taken account of by the risk-averse agents. In fact, in the interaction
between uncertainty, learning, optimal behavior, and market equilibrium,
risk aversion plays a central role not only in the decision-making process but
also in the learning process. Since the learning process yields uncertainty, a
natural question is the effect of risk aversion on the equilibrium outcomes of
the model, including the amount of information released by the market.
In this paper, we consider a competitive market in which demand is com-
posed of both informed and uninformed buyers. The informed buyers know
the quality of the good. The uninformed buyers use Bayesian methods to
infer information about quality from observing the price. On the supply side,
the representative, price-taking firm produces and sells the good. The cost
of production is assumed to be increasing in quality and quantity. There is
also a noise, a random noise component, which is known to the firm, but
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unknown to buyers. The presence of noise in the market prevents complete
learning by the uninformed consumers, which fundamentally affects the mar-
ket equilibrium.1
We provide two sets of results on the effect of risk aversion on the com-
petitive equilibrium with learning. First, we study the effect of risk aversion
on the competitive price and quantity. We show that an increase in risk aver-
sion induces a downward movement of the demand curve, which decreases
price and output. The effect of risk aversion on demand is both direct and
indirect. The direct effect is to reduce the demand of the uninformed buyers,
which shifts demand inward. The indirect effect of risk aversion is through
the updating rule of the uninformed buyers. Indeed, the updating rule (as a
function of price) depends on risk aversion.
Our second result concerns the influence of risk aversion on the amount
of information transferred through the competitive equilibrium. We show
that risk aversion has no effect on the conveyance of information through
prices and thus on the updated beliefs (i.e., the posterior mean). To under-
stand why risk aversion has no effect on what the uninformed buyers learn,
note first that an increase in risk aversion does reduce the uninformed buyers
demand, essentially reducing the influence of the uninformed buyers on the
equilibrium and thus making the presence of informed buyers more impor-
tant. However, this increase in the relative importance of informed buyers
does not make the equilibrium price more informative. The reason is that
the amount of information contained in the price can be summarized by a
sufficient statistics that is independent of risk aversion. Hence, changes in
risk aversion do not alter the conveyance of information through the price
and thus the value of the posterior mean (which is relevant to the uninformed
buyers demand) remains the same, i.e., is unaffected by changes in risk aver-
sion. Note that since the level of the equilibrium price changes (although
1Our work falls in the category of rational expectations models that study information
flows in perfectly competitive markets (Kihlstrom and Mirman, 1975; Grossman, 1976,
1978; Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980; Diamond and Verrecchia, 1981; Hellwig, 1980). The
majority of these papers considers the trading of a financial asset and, thus, there is no
firm supplying the good. We take a different point of view by addressing the issue of
learning in a market for a good or service in which the behavior of a price-taking firm is
made explicit.
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the information contained in it does not), the updating rule (as a function
of price) adapts in such a way as to yield the same value of the posterior
mean. It does not however mean that the updating rule puts more weight
or less weight on the information contained in the price, i.e., this change in
the updating rule is not due to changes in the informativeness of the signal
since the price carries the same amount of information. Our result on infor-
mation flows being independent of risk aversion complements the one stated
in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) in an endowment economy about the effect
of the variance of the demand shock on the informativeness of the price. In-
deed, from Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), “...an increase in noise reduces the
informativeness of the price system: but it leads more individuals to become
informed; the remarkable result obtained above establishes that the two ef-
fects exactly offset each other so that the equilibrium informativeness of the
price system is unchanged”(their italic).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 characterizes the learning
equilibrium with a competitive market, whereas Section 3 considers the effect
of uncertainty and risk aversion on equilibrium, particularly on learning. We
provide concluding remarks in Section 4.
2 Equilibrium with risk averse learning buyer
in a competitive market
In this section we study the learning equilibrium of a competitive market
with risk averse buyers.
On the supply side there is a competitive firm, which maximizes profit
given price P. The firm has a cost function dependent on quantity Q , quality,
θ ≥ 0, and a random noise ε˜:
C(Q) = CF + (γθθ + ε˜)Q+ γqQ
2, γθ, γq > 0
2 (1)
2Throughout this work we assume that γq is strictly positive.The case where γq = 0,
i.e., the supply function is horizontal, was extensively studied in (Mirman et al., 2014).
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where ε˜ is a normally-distributed noise3, with ε˜ ∼ n(0, σ2ε)4. It is assumed
that the realization of ε˜ is known to the firm but not to the buyers.
From the cost function we derive the supply function. As the firm is a
price taker, it will choose its output to maximize profit setting marginal cost
equal to price, i.e.,
P = γθθ + γqQ
S + ε˜ (2)
or
QS =
P − γθθ − ε˜
γq
(3)
On the demand side, there is a fraction λ ∈ (0, 1) of consumers who
are informed about the value of the θ. The remaining fraction, (1 − λ),
of consumers is not informed and must learn about the quality. These are,
respectively, the informed consumers I and learning consumers L . The learn-
ing consumers extract information from observing the price. Specifically, a
learning consumer has prior beliefs5 regarding quality that are given by
θ˜a ∼ n
(
µθ, σ
2
θ
)
, µθ > 0 (4)
represented by the p.d.f. ξˆ(θa). Given P these prior beliefs are updated to
the posterior beliefs θ˜p|P ∼ n (µˆθ, σˆ2θ), with µˆθ =
∫
R xξˆ(x|P )dx > 0. The
corresponding posterior p.d.f. ξˆ(θp|P ) is computed according to Bayes’ rule.
We define χ(P ) to be the updating rule for the posterior mean, i.e., µˆθ = χ(P )
3The tilde sign differentiates a random variable from its realization.
4In order to study noisy signaling in a competitive market, we rely on the fact that the
family of normal distributions with an unknown mean is a conjugate family for samples
from a normal distribution. A normal distribution combined with linear demand yields
closed-form equilibrium values and makes the analysis tractable by focusing on the mean
and variance of price and posterior beliefs(see Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), Kyle (1985),
Judd and Riordan (1994) for the use of normal distributions to study the informational
role of prices in single-agent problems). Hence, the normality assumption allows us to
gain insight into information flows in a noisy environment. Although equilibrium price
and posterior mean quality can admit negative values, restrictions on parameter values
ensures that the probability of a negative price or a negative posterior mean be arbitrarily
close to zero.
5We use θ˜a to denote the prior (ex ante) beliefs of the learning buyers regarding quality,
and θ˜p for their posterior (ex post) beliefs. This avoids confusion between prior beliefs,
posterior beliefs and the true quality θ.
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Both types of consumers maximize the expected value of their CARA
utility functions, given by Ui(Q) = − exp
{
−ai
[
θQ− Q2
2
+ y
]}
, subject to
their budget constraint (I=PQ+y). The parameter ai > 0 is the Arrow-Pratt
coefficient of absolute risk-aversion; a bigger ai corresponds to a more risk
averse agent. Here, y is an alternative good with no risk and price standard-
ized to 1. While the informed buyers know θ , their certainty equivalent is
CEI =
[
θQ− Q2
2
+ y
]
. The certainty equivalent of the learning buyers is
CEL =
[
µˆθ − 1 + aLσˆ
2
θ
2
Q
]
Q+ y (5)
The demand functions of both types of buyers are then given, respectively,
by :
QDI = θ − P (6)
QDL =
µˆθ − P
1 + aLσˆ2θ
(7)
The demand of the informed buyers is the difference between the quality,
θ, and price. The demand of the learning buyers is the difference between the
expected value of their posterior beliefs about quality, µˆθ, and price, divided
by (1 +aLσˆ
2
θ). This last term reflects the effect of risk aversion and posterior
uncertainty. When aL → 0, i.e. when we approach risk neutrality, the
demand function of the learning buyers tends to the demand function of the
informed buyers, but with θ replaced by the posterior beliefs. When either
the coefficient of risk aversion or the posterior variance increases, demand by
the learning buyers decreases.
Total demand is the sum of the demands of the informed and of the
learning agents. This sum is given by
QD(P, θ) = λ (θ − P ) + (1− λ) µˆθ − P
1 + aLσˆ2θ
(8)
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From (8), the inverse demand is given by
P =
(1 + aLσˆ
2
θ)λθ + (1− λ) µˆθ
(1 + aLσˆ2θ)λ+ (1− λ)
− (1 + aLσˆ
2
θ)Q
D
(1 + aLσˆ2θ)λ+ (1− λ)
(9)
Note that, while the inverse supply function has a random component,
the inverse demand has not. However, the variability of the equilibrium price
depends on demand through the slope of the inverse demand, which is
∂P
∂QD
= − (1 + aLσˆ
2
θ)
(1 + aLσˆ2θ)λ+ (1− λ)
(10)
which becomes steeper, i.e. more negative, when risk-aversion increases:
∂2P
∂QD∂aL
= − (1− λ) σˆ
2
θ
[(1 + aLσˆ2θ)λ+ (1− λ)]2
< 0 (11)
This rotation of the demand function due to risk aversion and its effect
on the variance of the equilibrium price is further discussed in section 2.2.
2.1 The equilibrium
Having described the market structure, we now define the equilibrium. The
learning competitive equilibrium consists of the quantity of the firm, Q∗(θ, ε),
the uninformed buyers’ posterior beliefs about quality upon observing the
realized price, ξˆ∗(·|P ), and the distribution of the market-clearing price
P ∗(θ, ε˜). In terms of notation, x is a dummy variable for quality and the
asterisk sign on a variable denotes the equilibrium value.
Definition 2.1. The n-tuple
[
Q∗(θ, ε), ξˆ∗(·|P ), P ∗(θ, ε)
]
is a competitive equi-
librium with learning if,
1. Firm. For all (θ, ε), given P ∗(θ, ε),
Q∗(θ, ε) = arg max
Q≥0
{P ∗(θ, ε)Q− C(Q, θ, ε)} . (12)
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2. Uninformed buyers. For all θ, given the price-signal P ∗(θ, ε˜) with
corresponding p.d.f. φ∗P (P |θ), posterior beliefs upon observing the real-
ization P = P ∗(θ, ε) are
ξˆ∗(θp|P ) ∝ ξ(θa)φ∗P (P |θ) (13)
by Bayes’ rule.
3. Market-clearing price. For all (θ, ε), given Q∗(θ, ε) and ξˆ∗(·|P ),
P ∗(θ, ε) clears the market, i.e.,
λ(θ − P ∗(θ, ε)) + (1− λ)( µˆ
∗
θ(P )|P=P ∗(θ,ε) − P ∗(θ, ε)
1 + aLσˆ2θ
) = Q∗(θ, ε) (14)
where µˆ∗θ(P ) ≡
∫
x≥0 xξˆ
∗(x|P )dx is the updating rule.
From Statement 1 of the definition of equilibrium, the firm’s conjecture
about the price, after observing ε, is correct. Moreover, from Statements 2,
the uninformed buyers’ conjecture, not knowing ε, of the distribution of the
price-signal (conditional on θ) is correct. This correct conjecture is then used
to form posterior beliefs. Finally, the market-clearing price and posterior be-
liefs are dependent on each other. On the one hand, the market-clearing
condition and the distribution of the price-signal are influenced by the up-
dating rule (Statements 2 and 3). On the other hand, from Statement 2, in
equilibrium, posterior beliefs depend on the correct conditional distribution
of the price-signal.
Proposition 2.2 states that there exists a unique equilibrium in which
the price retains the normal distribution and the updating rule is a linear
function of the prior mean and the price signal.
Proposition 2.2. Under the conditions of Definition 2.1, with cost function
defined by (1), there exists an unique learning competitive equilibrium (LE)
in which the updating rule for the posterior mean is a linear function of the
prior beliefs and the price signal.
1. In equilibrium, the posterior beliefs are given by ξˆ∗(θp|P ) ∼ n (µˆθ, σˆ2θ),
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with
µˆθ = aµθ + bP
∗(θ, ε) (15)
and
σˆ2θ =
σ2εσ
2
θ
σ2ε + σ
2
θ [γθ + γqλ]
2 (16)
with
a =
σ2ε(1 + aLσˆ
2
θ)
(1 + aLσˆ2θ)
[
σ2ε + σ
2
θ [γθ + γqλ]
2]+ γq(1− λ) [γθ + γqλ]σ2θ (17)
and
b =
(1 + γqλ)(1 + aLσˆ
2
θ) [γθ + γqλ]σ
2
θ + γq(1− λ) [γθ + γqλ]σ2θ
(1 + aLσˆ2θ)
[
σ2ε + σ
2
θ [γθ + γqλ]
2]+ γq(1− λ) [γθ + γqλ]σ2θ (18)
2. The equilibrium price is
P ∗(θ, ε) =
(σ2ε + σ
2
θ [γθ + λγq]
2)(1 + aLσˆ
2
θ) + γq(1− λ) [γθ + γqλ]σ2θ
(σ2ε + [γθ + λγq]
2 σ2θ)[(1 + γqλ)(1 + aLσˆ
2
θ) + γq(1− λ)]
[γθ + λγq] θ
+
σ2εγq(1− λ)
(σ2ε + [γθ + λγq]
2 σ2θ)[(1 + γqλ)(1 + aLσˆ
2
θ) + γq(1− λ)]
µθ
+
(σ2ε + σ
2
θ [γθ + λγq]
2)(1 + aLσˆ
2
θ) + γq(1− λ) [γθ + γqλ]σ2θ
(σ2ε + [γθ + λγq]
2 σ2θ)[(1 + γqλ)(1 + aLσˆ
2
θ) + γq(1− λ)]
ε
(19)
with distribution given by P(θ, ε˜, ξˆ∗(·)) ∼ n(µˆP , σˆ2P ) 6.
6Here µˆP is written as
µˆP = λ
(γθ + γqλ)(1 + aLσˆ
2
θ)
(1 + γqλ)(1 + aLσˆ2θ) + γq(1− λ)
θ
+ (1− λ) (γθ + γqλ)(1 + aLσˆ
2
θ) + γqσ
2
εµθ + [γθ + γqλ]
2
σ2θθ
(σ2ε + [γθ + λγq]
2
σ2θ)[(1 + γqλ)(1 + aLσˆ
2
θ) + γq(1− λ)]
(20)
This formulation shows that the expected price depends on the behavior of the two types
of consumers.
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3. Equilibrium output is
Q∗(θ, ε) =
P ∗(θ, ε)− γθθ − ε
γq
(21)
Proof. Substituting (1) into (12) and solving (12) yields (21). Then assume
the posterior mean of the quality parameter is given by the updating rule in
(15) . Plugging (15) and (21) into (14) and solving for the price, yields the
equilibrium price as a function of a and b
P(θ, ε) =
[γθ + γqλ] (1 + aLσˆ
2
θ)θ + γq(1− λ)aµθ + (1 + aLσˆ2θ)ε
(1 + γqλ)(1 + aLσˆ2θ) + γq(1− b)(1− λ)
(22)
Hence the conditional distribution
Pˆ |θ ∼ n (µˆP |θ; σˆ2P |θ) (23)
with
µˆP |θ =
[γθ + γqλ] (1 + aLσˆ
2
θ)θ + γq(1− λ)aµθ
(1 + γqλ)(1 + aLσˆ2θ) + γq(1− b)(1− λ)
(24)
σˆ2P |θ =
[
(1 + aLσˆ
2
θ)
(1 + γqλ)(1 + aLσˆ2θ) + γq(1− b)(1− λ)
]2
σ2ε (25)
We define
z =
[(1 + γqλ)(1 + aLσˆ
2
θ) + γq(1− b)(1− λ)]
[γθ + γqλ] (1 + aLσˆ2θ)
P (θ, ε)
− γq(1− λ)a
[γθ + γqλ] (1 + aLσˆ2θ)
= θ +
ε
[γθ + γqλ]
(26)
with conditional distribution z|θ
z|θ ∼ n
(
θ;
σ2ε
[γθ + γqλ]
2
)
(27)
.
From (27) and from the prior distribution of beliefs (4) the posterior
distribution θ˜p|z is obtained,
11
θˆp|z ∼ n
(
z [γθ + γqλ]
2 σ2θ + σ
2
εµθ
σ2ε + σ
2
θ [γθ + γqλ]
2 ;
σ2εσ
2
θ
σ2ε + σ
2
θ [γθ + γqλ]
2
)
(28)
Substituting in (28) z for its expression in order of P (given in (26)), we
obtain the posterior pdf for θˆp|P , i.e.,
θˆp|P ∼ n
(
µˆθ; σˆ
2
θ
)
(29)
with
µˆθ =
(1 + aLσˆ
2
θ)σ
2
εµθ − γq(1− λ)(γθ + γqλ)σ2θa
[σ2ε + σ
2
θ(γθ + γqλ)
2] (1 + aLσˆ2θ)
+
(1 + aLσˆ
2
θ)(1 + γqλ) + γq(1− b)(1− λ)(γθ + γqλ)σ2θ
[σ2ε + σ
2
θ(γθ + γqλ)
2] (1 + aLσˆ2θ)
P (θ, ε) (30)
σˆ2θ =
σ2εσ
2
θ
(γθ + γqλ)2σ2θ + σ
2
ε
(31)
Equating µˆθ = aµθ + bP and solving for a and b we arrive at (17) and
(18), confirming the existence of a linear updating rule. Substituting (17)
and (18) into (22) yields (19).
Note that the distribution of the posterior beliefs has a nonrandom vari-
ance (see (16)) but a random mean. By (15), the posterior mean is a linear
function of the random price, and so also has a normal distribution.
The updating rule χ(P ) combines the prior beliefs of the learning con-
sumers (given by µθ) with the information inferred from the price (see (15),
(17) and (18)). The weights given to the prior beliefs and the price, respec-
tively a and b, vary with: i) the ratio between the variance of the prior beliefs
and the variance of the random supply noise (σ2θ/σ
2
ε); ii) the coefficient of
risk aversion (aL) and the posterior variance (σˆ
2
θ , which itself depends on the
parameters in i) and iii)); iii) the other parameters (λ, γθ and γq), which influ-
ence the slopes of the demand and supply curves. The expected equilibrium
price and quantity depend on all these parameters.
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2.2 Discussion
In this section we study the impact that the learning risk averse buyers
have on the equilibrium. For this purpose we compare the LE in Proposition
2.2 with the full information equilibrium (FIE), i.e., the equilibrium when all
buyers know θ.
We calculate the FIE, substituting λ = 1 in equations (15) to (21).
Remark 2.3. With λ = 1, FIE is:
P =
γθ + γq
1 + γq
θ +
ε
1 + γq
(32)
µˆP =
γθ+γq
1+γq
θ and σˆ2P =
σ2ε
(1+γq)2
E [Q|θ] = 1− γθ
1 + γq
θ (33)
For the expected output to be positive we assume that γθ < 1.
The difference between this FIE and the LE from Proposition 2.2 is due
to the impact of the presence of uninformed buyers. We depict the FIE and
the LE in Fig.1, assuming µθ < θ
7.
To understand the impact of the presence of risk-averse learning buyers,
the change from the FIE to the LE can be decomposed into two components.
The first is due to the presence of uninformed but nonlearning (naive) buy-
ers, i.e., buyers that do not update their prior beliefs. The second component
reflects the change in equilibrium due to the learning process, i.e., the up-
dating of prior beliefs upon observing the price. We call the first component
the prior beliefs effect and the second component the price effect.
To identify the prior beliefs effect we calculate the equilibrium of the
intermediate case with naive uninformed buyers8. In this intermediate case,
7We could also assume that µθ > θ. In this case the LE demand function would start
above the FIE demand function and would have a steeper slope
8This naive equilibrium is important in itself. We show in Section 3.2 that, when
uncertainty increases, the LE tends to the naive equilibrium
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demand by the learning buyers depends on the prior mean and variance.
Total demand is given by
QD(P, θ) = λ (θ − P ) + (1− λ) µθ − P
1 + aLσ2θ
(34)
Proposition 2.4. Assuming naive (nonlearning) uninformed buyers, with
supply and demand defined by (1) and (34), the competitive equilibrium is
given by, :
1.
P(θ, ε) =
[γθ + γqλ] (1 + aLσ
2
θ)θ + γq(1− λ)µθ + (1 + aLσ2θ)ε
(1 + γqλ)(1 + aLσ2θ) + γq(1− λ)
(35)
and
P˜(θ, ε) ∼ n(µˆP , σˆ2P ) (36)
2.
Q(θ, ε) =
P (θ, ε)− γθθ − ε
γq
(37)
Proof. Equation (37) derives immediately from (1), while (35) results from
(22), with a = 1 and b = 0. Finally, from (35) P is a linear function of ε,
hence it is normally distributed.
Note that, from (34), the naive inverse demand is given by
P (QD, θ) =
(1 + aLσ
2
θ)λθ + (1− λ)µθ − (1 + aLσ2θ)QD
(1 + aLσ2θ)λ+ (1− λ)
(38)
From (38), P (QD|QD = 0), the intercept on the y-axis, is equal to (larger
than, smaller than) the equivalent intercept in the FIE expected demand
if µθ = θ (µθ > θ, µθ < θ). If the uninformed buyers are naive then the
demand function shifts up or down (relative to the FIE), depending on the
prior being over or undervalued. The presence of uninformed risk-averse
naive buyers also rotates the demand function, increasing its slope9. So,
9From (34), QD(P |P = 0), the x-axis intercept, is smaller than the FI solution if µθ≤θ,
and can go either way if µθ>θ.
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even if prior beliefs are unbiased, there is always a difference between naive
and FI demand, due to the risk aversion of the uninformed buyers. Note that
in the case of risk neutral10 naive buyers the demand curve does not rotate.
This rotation of the naive demand curve is due to the effect of risk aversion
and has an impact on the equilibrium quantity and price.
In fact, even though the supply function is not affected by risk aversion,
the presence of uninformed naive buyers changes the equilibrium price and
output, again even if prior beliefs are unbiased. The increase in the slope of
the demand curve (compared with the FIE) due to the presence of uninformed
naive buyers means that: a) if µθ ≤ θ, the naive price and output are always
below the FI solutions; b) if µθ > θ, the naive equilibrium price and output
may be above, below or coincide with the FI solutions, depending on the
values of all parameters. We depict these two situation in Fig.2 and Fig.3.
Next consider the price effect. The change in equilibrium due to the price
effect is the difference between the naive equilibrium of Proposition 2.4 and
the LE of Proposition 2.2. This price effect shifts the LE demand function
back towards the FI demand while also rotating it. This is similar to the
risk neutral case. However, the presence of risk aversion ensures that the
LE demand never coincides with the FIE demand even if prior beliefs are
unbiased, as in the risk neutral case. Fig.4 and Fig.5 illustrate the cases of
under and overvalued prior.
3 The effects of risk aversion and uncertainty
In this section we study the effect of uncertainty and risk aversion on the
learning process and the learning equilibrium. When referring to uncer-
tainty, we must distinguish between prior uncertainty (introduced by the
prior variance, σ2θ , and the variance of noisy demand, σ
2
ε) and posterior un-
certainty, characterized by the posterior variance, σˆ2θ . We show that risk
aversion affects the learning process changing the distribution of θˆp|P , i.e.,
10Henceforth, when we refer the risk neutral case we are referring to the limit case when
aL → 0 and the demand of the learning buyers tends to QDL = µˆθ − P . This limit case
corresponds to the risk-neutral case studied in (Mirman et al., 2014).
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the conditional distribution of posterior beliefs for an observed P. However,
it has no effect on Eµˆ∗θ(P ∗(θ, ε˜)), the average value of the posterior mean11.
Increasing risk aversion shifts the price distribution, lowering expected price
and expected output. On the other hand, prior uncertainty affects both the
learning process and the marginal posterior distribution. Finally, the effects
of risk aversion and posterior uncertainty cannot be studied separately.
Starting with this last comment, notice that the coefficient of risk aversion
always appears connected with posterior uncertainty , in (1+aLσˆ
2
θ). As noted
in Section 2, the term (1 + aLσˆ
2
θ) reflects the effect of posterior uncertainty
about quality on the demand function of the uninformed buyers. Without
posterior uncertainty (σˆ2θ = 0) there is no risk aversion effect and without
risk aversion (aL → 0) there is no effect of posterior uncertainty.
The posterior variance, σˆ2θ =
σ2εσ
2
θ
σ2ε+σ
2
θ [γθ+γqλ]
2 , increases with the prior vari-
ance, σ2θ , and the variance of the supply noise, σ
2
ε . Moreover, σˆ
2
θ decreases
with γθ, the impact of quality on the cost, with the slope of the supply
function, γq, and with λ, the fraction of informed buyers.
If either aL or σˆ
2
θ tend to zero we approach the risk neutral case and the
same results as in Mirman et al. (2014) are applicable.
Remark 3.1. If aL → 0 or σˆ2θ = 012 , then the LE tends to the risk neutral
results:
a =
σ2ε
(γθ + γq)(γθ + γqλ)σ2θ + σ
2
ε
(39)
b =
(1 + γq)(γθ + γqλ)σ
2
θ
(γθ + γq)(γθ + γqλ)σ2θ + σ
2
ε
(40)
11Here, E is the expectation operator with respect to the p.d.f. φ∗P (·|θ).
12σˆ2θ = 0 may result from two different situations: if γq = 0 or σ
2
ε = 0 we have perfect
learning and non random price; if σ2θ = 0 we have no learning at all.
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µˆP =
γθ + γqλ
1 + γq
{
[γθ + γq] [γθ + γqλ]σ
2
θ + σ
2
ε
[γθ + γqλ]
2 σ2θ + σ
2
ε
}
θ
+
(1− λ)γq
1 + γq
{
σ2ε
[γθ + γqλ]
2 σ2θ + σ
2
ε
}
µθ (41)
E [Q|θ] = µˆP − γθθ − ε
γq
(42)
3.1 The effect of risk aversion
This section studies the impact that risk aversion has on the learning
process and on the LE. Starting with the learning process, we analyze the
effect of risk aversion on the updating rule, µˆθ = aµθ + bP . Note that µˆθ is
not a convex combination of µθ and P, i.e., a+ b 6= 1. Define
b′ =
[(γθ + γqλ)(1 + aLσˆ
2
θ) + γq(1− λ)] [γθ + γqλ]σ2θ
σ2ε(1 + aLσˆ
2
θ) + [(γθ + γqλ)(1 + aLσˆ
2
θ) + γq(1− λ)] [γθ + γqλ]σ2θ
(43)
Then a+ b′ = 1, and the posterior mean is given by the convex combination
µˆθ = aµθ + b
′P ′, where P’, the revised price13, is
P ′ =
(1 + γqλ)(1 + aLσˆ
2
θ) + γq(1− λ)
(γθ + γqλ)(1 + aLσˆ2θ) + γq(1− λ)
P > P (44)
We now look to the effect of risk aversion on the weights, a and b’.
Dividing both the numerator and the denominator of a by (1 + aLσˆ
2
θ) yields:
a =
σ2ε
σ2ε +
[
[γθ + γqλ] +
γq(1−λ)
(1+aLσˆ
2
θ)
]
[γθ + γqλ]σ2θ
(45)
Compared with the coefficient a in the risk neutral case from (39), note
that the denominator decreases with aL, thus increasing a. As a + b
′ = 1,
when a increases b’ decreases. Hence, the presence of risk aversion changes
13With Full Information, λ = 1, the expected value of this revised price is equal to the
true quality, θ.
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the weights of the prior beliefs and the revised observed price in the learning
process, giving more weight to prior beliefs and giving less to the information
conveyed by the revised observed price14.
Despite these changes in the coefficients of the updating rule, from Propo-
sition 3.2 the effect of risk aversion on Eµˆ∗θ(P ∗(θ, ε˜)) is null. In fact, risk
aversion changes the posterior distribution of θ˜p|P but not the conditional
distribution of θ˜p|ε 15. This means the price signal adjusts to compensate for
the changes in a and b’, in a way that ensures that, for any realization of the
supply noise ε the posterior beliefs in the risk aversion case are the same as
in the risk neutral case.
Proposition 3.2. Under the conditions of Definition 2.1, with supply and
demand defined by (1), (12) and (8), the coefficient of risk aversion has no
effect on the conditional distribution of the posterior beliefs for a given noise,
ξˆ∗(θp|ε) ∼ n
(
µθp , σ
2
θp
)
, with µθp and σ
2
θp
independent from aL.
Moreover, learning always occurs on average, i.e.:
1.
Eµˆ∗θ(P˜ ∗) = αµθ + (1− α)θ, 0 < α ≤ 1 (46)
2.
σˆ2θ =
σ2εσ
2
θ
σ2ε + σ
2
θ [γθ + γqλ]
2 < σ
2
θ (47)
Proof. Substituting (26) in (28) we obtain
ξˆ∗(θp|ε) ∼ n
 [γθ + γqλ]2 σ2θ
[
θ + ε
γθ+γqλ
]
+ σ2εµθ
σ2ε + σ
2
θ [γθ + γqλ]
2 ;
σ2εσ
2
θ
σ2ε + σ
2
θ [γθ + γqλ]
2

(48)
14Note that P’ itself changes with risk aversion, increasing away from P. However the
revised price always lays in the interval
[
1+γq
γθ+γq
P ;
1+γqλ
γθ+γqλ
P
]
, as aL goes from zero to infinity.
15The conditional distribution of θ˜p|P is the subjective distribution of the posterior
beliefs of the learning buyers, resulting from their updating process for a given equilibrium
price. The conditional distribution of θ˜p|ε is not relevant for the learning buyers, because
they cannot observe the random noise ε. However, as the informed observers (us) know
the function P ∗(θ, ε˜), we can predict how the posterior beliefs react for each realization of
the random noise, obtaining the conditional distribution of θ˜p|ε.
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showing that µθp and σ
2
θp
are independent from aL, the coefficient of risk
aversion. Moreover, µθp is random (linear in ε) while σ
2
θp
is nonrandom (in-
dependent of ε). Taking expectations of µθp with respect to the distribution
of ε, we obtain
Eµθp = Eµˆ∗θ(P˜ ∗) =
[γθ + γqλ]
2 σ2θθ + σ
2
εµθ
σ2ε + σ
2
θ [γθ + γqλ]
2 (49)
From (49) we derive (46), with α = σ
2
ε
σ2ε+(γθ+γqλ)
2σ2θ
. Equation (47) comes
from (16) .
From Proposition 3.2 the conditional distribution θ˜p|ε does not depend on
risk aversion, i.e., for a given realization of the random noise, ε, the posterior
beliefs are exactly the same with or without risk aversion. However, for a
given observed price, posterior beliefs depend on risk aversion, because the
weights a and b depend on risk aversion.
Risk aversion changes the likelihood function, i.e., the distribution of price
for a given θ, so that the same realization of the supply noise ε translates
into different observed prices in the risk aversion and the risk neutral case.
The effect of risk aversion is to diminish the demand of the learning buyers,
so the demand of the informed buyers has a bigger fraction of total demand.
Then the observed price becomes depends more on the informed buyers than
with no risk aversion. In other words, the price in the risk averse case is
more dependent (comparing with the risk neutral case) on θ and less on the
prior beliefs of the uninformed buyers. This change in the price completely
compensate the changes in a and b.
Analytically, equation (19) shows that the expected mean of the equilib-
rium price is a linear combination of θ and µθ. After some manipulation, the
expected equilibrium price is written as:
µˆP |θ =
1
b
{
[γθ + γqλ]
2 σ2θ
(γθ + γqλ)2σ2θ + σ
2
ε
θ +
[
σ2ε
(γθ + γqλ)2σ2θ + σ
2
ε
− a
]
µθ
}
(50)
Hence, as the presence of risk aversion changes the weights a and b, the
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expected price is inversely proportional to b and annuls the effect of a, main-
taining the expected posterior mean unchanged. This complete compensation
happens because the posterior distribution can be written as a function of a
sufficient statistic, z (used in the proof of Proposition 2.2), which does not
depend on risk aversion16.
From Proposition 3.2, the effect of risk aversion on the expected price and
output is determined. Compare the risk averse and the risk neutral cases.
From equation (14), for the same random noise, if the equilibrium price was
equal in both cases, the demand at the market equilibrium with positive risk
aversion would be smaller than without risk aversion, creating excess supply.
So, for the same random noise, with risk aversion the equilibrium price must
be smaller than in the risk neutral case. Note that, in this argument, the
supply function and the posterior beliefs are the same in both cases, as was
shown in Proposition 3.2. The supply function remaining unchanged, output
also decreases with risk aversion. If, for any random noise, equilibrium price
and output are smaller with risk aversion, then expected price and output
decrease with risk aversion.
Remark 3.3. Expected price and output diminishes with risk aversion.
3.2 The effect of prior uncertainty
In this section we study the effect of both components of prior uncertainty:
the variance of the supply noise, σ2ε (henceforth called supply uncertainty)
and the prior variance, σ2θ .
16(Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980) arrive at similar results, but concerning the effect of the
variance of the demand shock on the informativeness of the price. They say: “..an increase
in noise reduces the informativeness of the price system: but it...leads more individuals
to become informed; the remarkable result obtained above establishes that the two effects
exactly offset each other so that the equilibrium informativeness of the price system is
unchanged”(their italic). In their model it is the percentage of informed traders, λ, that is
endogenous (in our model it is exogenous) and so it is λ that adjusts. Again, in (Grossman
and Stiglitz, 1980), what happens is that there is a sufficient statistic for the unknown
parameter θ (wλ(θ, x)) which does not depend on the demand uncertainty, hence the latter
has no influence on posterior beliefs.
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3.2.1 The effect on learning
When σ2ε = 0 there is no posterior uncertainty, learning becomes perfect and
risk aversion irrelevant. Hence, as in the FI equilibrium.
µˆθ = θ and σˆ
2
θ = 0
a = 0 and b = 1+γq
γθ+γq
σˆ2P = 0 and P = µˆP =
γθ+γq
1+γq
θ
Q = E [Q|θ] = 1−γθ
1+γq
θ
On the other hand, when σ2θ = 0 there is no posterior uncertainty and
risk aversion becomes irrelevant, but there is no learning17. Hence,
µˆθ = µθ and σˆ
2
θ = 0
a = 1 and b = 0
µˆP =
γθθ+γq [λθ+(1−λ)µθ]
1+γq
and σˆ2P =
σ2ε
(1+γq)2
Q = λθ+(1−λ)µθ−γθθ−ε
1+γq
Next consider the case of σ2ε > 0 and σ
2
θ > 0. Contrary to the effect of risk
aversion, prior uncertainty does influence the posterior distribution, through
both the posterior mean and the posterior variance. Prior uncertainty affects
the posterior mean through the updating rule . The weight a (b’ is 1-a),
depends directly on the ratio of the prior and the supply noise variance,
σ2θ
σ2ε
:
a =
1
1 +
[
[γθ + γqλ]
2 + γq(1−λ)[γθ+γqλ]
(1+aLσˆ
2
θ)
]
σ2θ
σ2ε
(51)
This direct effect implies that, when
σ2θ
σ2ε
increases (decreases) a decreases
(increases) and b’ increases (decreases). Hence, if the variability of the prior
17If σ2ε = σ
2
θ = 0 we have an indeterminacy. The learning buyers are completely sure
about their prior beliefs and, simultaneously, price is perfectly informative. What should
they belief?
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beliefs increases relative to the supply noise variability, learning buyers put
more weight on the observed information (b’ ) and less weight on the prior
beliefs (a).
But there is also an indirect effect, acting through the posterior variance
σˆ2θ . When either σ
2
ε or σ
2
θ increases so does the posterior variance σˆ
2
θ . An
increase in σˆ2θ has the same effect as risk aversion: increases a, decreases b’.
Hence:
1. If σ2ε increases,
σ2θ
σ2ε
decreases and σˆ2θ increases, implying that a increases,
while b’ decreases. More supply uncertainty increases the weight of
prior beliefs and diminishes the weight of the revised observed price.
2. If σ2ε decreases,
σ2θ
σ2ε
increases and σˆ2θ decreases, implying that a decreases
and b’ increases. Less supply uncertainty decreases the weight of prior
beliefs and increases the weight of the revised observed price.
3. If σ2θ increases, both
σ2θ
σ2ε
and σˆ2θ increase, and the effect in a and b’ is
ambiguous.
4. If σ2θ decreases, both
σ2θ
σ2ε
and σˆ2θ decrease, and the effect in a and b’ is
ambiguous.
As σˆ2θ changes, so changes
(1+γqλ)(1+aLσˆ
2
θ)+γq(1−λ)
(γθ+γqλ)(1+aLσˆ
2
θ)+γq(1−λ)
, the proportion between P’
and P, adding to the ambiguity of the total effects. However, the change
is P’ is bounded within the interval
[
1+γq
γθ+γq
P ; 1+γqλ
γθ+γqλ
P
]
. Asymptotically, all
ambiguities disappear.
In the limit, if σ2ε → ∞ then a → 1 and b′ → 0. On the other hand, if
σ2θ → ∞ then a → 0 and b′ → 1. Hence, when the variance of the supply
noise increases to infinity, more weight is put on the prior beliefs and less
weight on the observed price, reducing learning. In fact, from (15) and (16),
in the limit there is no learning if σ2ε →∞:
µˆθ → µθ and σˆ2θ → σ2θ
When the prior variance increases to infinity, i.e., σ2θ →∞, learning depends
only on the observed information:
µˆθ → P ′ and σˆ2θ → σ
2
ε
[γθ+γqλ]
2
22
3.2.2 The effect on price and output
The market equilibrium (see (14)) is affected by σ2ε through the posterior
mean and the posterior variance. The posterior mean tends to the prior
mean as market uncertainty increases. If the prior mean is overvalued, µθ >
θ, demand increases; if the prior mean is undervalued, µθ < θ, demand
decreases. The posterior variance increases with σ2ε , thus decreasing demand.
If the prior is undervalued demand unequivocally decreases when σ2ε in-
creases. If the prior is overvalued, the joint effect of the posterior mean and
the posterior variance can go either way, depending on the values of the pa-
rameters. Again, from Proposition 2.2, the limits of the price distribution as
σ2ε →∞ are:
µˆP→ [γθ+γqλ](1+aLσ
2
θ)θ+γq(1−λ)µθ
(1+γqλ)(1+aLσ
2
θ)+γq(1−λ)
and σˆ2P →∞
In the limit, expected price is equal to (35) and the equilibrium tends to
the naive equilibrium defined in Proposition 2.4. Because learning disappears
in the limit, uninformed buyers act asymptotically naive.
Market equilibrium is also affected by the prior variance, σ2θ , through the
posterior mean and the posterior variance. As the prior variance increases
the posterior mean tends to the revised price , while the posterior variance
increases. If the prior mean is undervalued, µθ < θ, demand increases; if the
prior mean is overvalued, µθ > θ, demand decreases. The posterior variance
increases with σ2θ , thus decreasing demand.
If the prior is overvalued demand unequivocally decreases when σ2θ in-
creases. If the prior is undervalued, the joint effect of the posterior mean
and the posterior variance can go either way, depending on the values of the
parameters. Again, from Proposition 2.2 and equation (44), the limits of the
price distribution as σ2θ →∞ are:
µˆP→γθ+γqλ1+γqλ θ and σˆ2P →
σ2ε
[γθ+γqλ]
2
3.2.3 The effect with no risk aversion
When studying the impact of prior uncertainty on learning and on the mar-
ket equilibrium, we remarked that there is a direct and an indirect effect,
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the latter through the posterior variance. We also noted that the indirect
effect acts through (1 + aLσˆ
2
θ). When there is no risk aversion, i.e. aL → 0,
this indirect effect disappears and the impact of prior uncertainty on learn-
ing and on the equilibrium becomes more straightforward. Proposition 3.4
states that, in the risk neutral case, increases in supply uncertainty makes
the posterior mean approach the prior mean while diverging from the true
value. This implies that the mean equilibrium price increases if the prior is
overvalued, decreases if it is undervalued and stays the same is the prior is
unbiased.
Proposition 3.4. If aL → 0 then in the limit case
∂a
∂σ2ε
> 0 ; ∂b
∂σ2ε
< 0
∂µˆθ
∂σ2ε
> 0⇐ µθ > θ ; ∂µˆθ∂σ2ε = 0⇐ µθ = θ ;
∂µˆθ
∂σ2ε
< 0⇐ µθ < θ
∂µˆP
∂σ2ε
> 0⇐ µθ > θ ; ∂µˆP∂σ2ε = 0⇐ µθ = θ ;
∂µˆP
∂σ2ε
< 0⇐ µθ < θ
Proof. When aL → 0, a and b and µˆP are given by (39), (40) and (41).
Deriving these expressions in order of σ2ε the results above are obtained.
From Proposition 3.4 we conclude that supply uncertainty impairs learn-
ing, because the posterior variance increases and the posterior mean moves
away from the true quality value.
Proposition 3.5 states that, in the risk neutral case, increases in prior
variance makes the posterior mean approach the true value while diverging
from the prior mean. This implies that the mean equilibrium price decreases
if the prior is overvalued, increases if it is undervalued and stays the same is
the prior is unbiased.
Proposition 3.5. If aL → 0 then in the limit case
∂a
∂σ2θ
< 0 ; ∂b
∂σ2θ
> 0
∂µˆθ
∂σ2θ
> 0⇐ µθ < θ ; ∂µˆθ∂σ2θ = 0⇐ µθ = θ ;
∂µˆθ
∂σ2θ
< 0⇐ µθ > θ
∂µˆP
∂σ2θ
> 0⇐ µθ < θ ; ∂µˆP∂σ2θ = 0⇐ µθ = θ ;
∂µˆP
∂σ2θ
< 0⇐ µθ > θ
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Proof. With aL → 0, a and b and µˆP are given by (39), (40) and (41).
Deriving these expressions in order of σ2θ the results above are obtained.
From Proposition 3.5 we conclude that prior variance has contradictory
effects upon learning. On one hand, the posterior mean approaches the true
quality value. But on the other hand the posterior variance increases.
4 Final remarks
This model, with production and asymmetric information in a competitive
market, explored the role of risk aversion and uncertainty on the learning
process and on the equilibrium price and output.However, risk aversion was
only relevant to the behavior of the learning buyer, not to the decisions on
the informed buyer or the firm.
It would be interesting to explore a model where risk aversion affects
the decisions of the firm, not only in a competitive market but also in a
monopolistic market. The monopolistic case may also provide the framework
to study strategic dynamic behavior, involving experimentation by some set
of agents.
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Figure 1: Full information and Bayesian Learning equilibrium
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Figure 2: Full information and Naive (undervalued) equilibrium
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Figure 3: Full information and Naive (overvalued) equilibrium
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Figure 4: Full information, Naive (undervalued) and Bayesian Learning equi-
librium
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